Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware clearly dominates, leads to a "race to the bottom" promoting management entrenchment at shareholders' expense. We present evidence here inconsistent with this hypothesis. Measures of director quality and governance mechanisms are higher in Delaware. Delaware's directors hire higher quality CEOs and they are more likely to terminate CEOs. Tenures of Delaware directors and CEOs are both lower than their counterparts in other states. In addition, contrary to claims that anti-takeover laws promote management entrenchment, we find that states that provide the greatest anti-takeover protectionOhio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland -do not have significantly different turnover rates from California, the state that arguably offers the least anti-takeover protection.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the relation between state corporate law and management entrenchment. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance -the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc. -while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders -annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings.
Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the greatest influence on corporate governance outcomes, such as management tenure.
Companies have a good deal of discretion in choosing their state of incorporation. The allocation to the states of primary authority over corporate governance, when combined with the "internal affairs" doctrine, which holds that courts must apply the law of the state of incorporation to corporate law disputes, has created a regime of "issuer choice" in state corporate law. Corporations are free to choose the law of the state that best suits the needs of their directors, managers and shareholders, without regard to where the corporation principally does business. States can compete to attract firms by offering the most attractive menu of corporate law rules. This competition for corporate charters is not just about state pride: States that attract incorporations are rewarded with tangible benefits in the form of charter fees. Of equal importance, incorporations are also likely to produce work for the state's lawyers, who may be an influential lobbying force (Macey, 2005) .
Critics of issuer choice argue that states compete for corporate charters by pandering to corporate managers. These critics charge that states are caught in a "race to the bottom," catering to management by providing rules which promote management entrenchment at the Delaware directors sit on more public company boards and receive more compensation. We posit that the director liability protections offered by Delaware may make it attractive for high-quality directors to serve in Delaware firms.
We also find that Delaware firms attract more institutional investors than other firms.
Institutional investors may prefer the predictability offered by Delaware courts. If institutions are effective monitors of management, the evidence is inconsistent with Delaware firms avoiding external monitoring.
Institutional investors are likely to be particularly concerned with the role that directors play in hiring top management and monitoring them. Accordingly, we analyze the quality of CEOs that the (higher-quality) Delaware directors hire and the termination decisions they make.
Similar to Rajagopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006), we proxy for CEO talent based on how frequently a CEO is mentioned in lists by popular media, and find that Delaware CEOs are significantly more likely to appear on these lists. We also find that Delaware firms are more likely to hire an outside CEO. Thus, Delaware directors are able to hire higher quality CEOs, possibly from a larger pool of CEOs who are willing to serve under more predictable Delaware law. We also find Delaware CEOs, like Delaware directors, have shorter tenures than their counterparts elsewhere. These measures of CEO quality do not support the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Does state of incorporation have any relation to CEO turnover? We find no evidence that that firms incorporated in Delaware are less likely to terminate (involuntarily) their CEO; indeed, we find involuntary turnover to be significantly more likely in most specifications. Our other findings, however, suggest that Delaware's higher turnover rate is unlikely to be related to its generally low level of anti-takeover protection. We find that the stringent anti-takeover states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Maryland (post 1998) (OPMM) do not have less CEO turnover than do firms in other states. In addition, the supposedly shareholder-protective jurisdiction of California does not have significantly higher CEO turnover. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that anti-takeover laws promote management entrenchment.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses prior literature and provides background on the differences between Delaware's corporate law and that of other states. Section 3 describes our sample. Section 4 presents our empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of our results in Section 5.
Background and prior research

Relevance of State of Incorporation for directors
Delaware does not compete on price: Delaware incorporation fees are generally higher than those charged by other states, and incorporating in Delaware does not produce any particular tax advantages. So does Delaware corporate law differ from that of other states in a way that is likely to affect management tenure? The differences between the Delaware General Corporation Law and its main competitor, the Model Business Corporation Act (adopted in over forty states) are slight, so doctrinal analysis yields few obvious clues.
One clue to understanding Delaware's lead in incorporations may come from comparing Delaware and California's corporate codes. A good portion of Delaware's lead comes at the expense of California (Subramanian, 2002) . There are a number of differences between Delaware and California law that may push firms headquartered in California to incorporate in Delaware, including voting rules, which may be important to firms planning rapid growth, and protection against personal liability for directors, which may be important to firms seeking high-demand directors and CEOs. On the personal liability point, Delaware arguably compares favorably not only to California, but also to virtually every other state. Some scholars have also pointed to anti-takeover provisions as an important driver of incorporation choice. On this point, Delaware has adopted an intermediate position. Delaware stands between California, which arguably offers the least anti-takeover protections, and the OPMM jurisdictions, which offer the most.
2.1.1. Voting Rules Romano (1985) finds that firms are likely to reincorporate in Delaware before committing to a program of mergers and acquisitions. Delaware, with its doctrine of "independent legal significance," gives corporations flexibility in structuring transactions and will not import procedures applicable to one type of transaction into another type.
1 This doctrine takes on practical importance in allowing acquiring corporations to avoid shareholder votes and appraisal rights in most circumstances. Delaware corporations can set up a holding company structure without a shareholder vote (Del. G. Corp. L. § 251(g)), which allows Delaware corporations to complete acquisitions through a triangular merger using a subsidiary without triggering a shareholder vote or appraisal.
California law, by contrast, affords voting rights to acquiring company shareholders not only in mergers, but also in asset and stock purchases ( (Black, Cheffins & Klausner, 2006) . 3 Firms incorporated in California are also subject to cumulative voting (Cal. Gen. Corp. Law § 708), which is intended to afford minority representation on corporate boards. Cumulative voting is unlikely to have much effect for firms with widely-dispersed shareholder bases, and California allows publicly-traded firms to opt out of the provision. (Cal. Corp. Law § 301.5). The opt-out is limited, however, to firms that are listed on the NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ Global. This means that many smaller public companies -the status that most companies are likely to have at the time of their IPO, when the choice of incorporation becomes salient -will be subject to cumulative voting, unless they opt to incorporate in Delaware or elsewhere. They are unlikely to switch back to California when they grow large enough to be listed. California firms that do opt for incorporation in another state may not have completely escaped California's regulatory grasp. California law purports to impose a number of its voting its requirements on foreign corporations if they have sufficient minimum contacts with California (Cal. Corp. Law § 2115). Delaware courts, at least, refuse to be bound by California's attempts to regulate the internal affairs of Delaware corporations. VantagePoint Ventures Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005 (7)). Kahan (2006) finds that states that have not adopted a liability limitation are significantly less likely to retain firms headquartered in their states. Once again, California is the leading example. California exculpates directors from liability for duty of care violations, but reckless acts are not covered (Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(10)(A)(iv)). Given the ease with which recklessness can be pleaded, this is a substantial limit on the exculpatory force of California's provision. Further enhancing directors' liability exposure, California also excludes indemnification for those acts (Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(11)).
Delaware law, by contrast, is particularly generous on indemnification. Delaware directors who prevail in a lawsuit against them have a statutory guarantee of indemnity from the corporation for the expense of their defense, (Del. Gen. Corp. L. §145(c)), which may be considerable. States following the M.B.C.A. also provide for guaranteed indemnification, but that provision requires complete exoneration (M.B.C.A. §8.52), whereas Delaware requires indemnification for partial success. Delaware may also be more generous in allowing companies to provide permissive indemnification. (Compare Del. Gen. Corp. L. §145(f) with M.B.C.A. §8.59.) These differences are muted, however, by D&O insurance policies, which go beyond indemnification in the range of conduct that can be covered. Such policies are universal, but they are subject to coverage limits that may not fully protect directors.
Beyond the differences in exculpation and indemnification, Delaware may promise directors more subtle advantages. Kahan (2006) finds that firms are more likely to incorporate in states with high quality judicial systems and flexible corporate law rules, two characteristics for which Delaware is well known (Romano, 1985) . Commentators suggest Delaware's experienced and expert judges who sit on its Court of Chancery may play an important role in protecting shareholder interests (Fisch, 2001 ).
That role is necessarily muted, however, by the very low probability that a director will be held personally liable. Notwithstanding the slim chance that a director will be found liable, the experience and expertise of Delaware judges may allow them to play an important "shaming" role, rebuking outside directors for inattention to their duties even while excusing them from liability (Rock, 1997) . The Delaware Supreme Court's recent Disney decision is a prominent example of this style of decisionmaking.
5 Moreover, the impact of Delaware judges is likely to be amplified by the attention given to their decisions by the media and legal academics.
Directors may be signaling their quality by pushing their firms to incorporate in Delaware, thereby announcing a willingness to have at least their reputation be held publicly accountable to shareholders (Iacobucci, 2006) . They do so, however, cognizant of the fact that they will not personally bear the consequences of suit. The costs of suit will be covered by the company's D&O policy, and any settlement will be paid from that policy or by the company.
The low probability of liability suggests that experienced and expert judges are not important because they are likely to intervene frequently to protect shareholder interests, thereby inducing Delaware board members to act as faithful monitors. Instead, an alternative causal story would suggest quality judges are important because they are likely to give directors comfort that they will not face liability because the judges produce litigation outcomes that are predictable (Romano, 1985) . Delaware law does not give directors comfort by shielding them from litigation; it simply guarantees that when litigation is brought, the directors will not be held personally liable (Macey, 2005 (Moodie, 2004) . Delaware created a shock to the system, and then benefitted from the ensuing uncertainty in the directors'
and officers' insurance market by fixing the problem more swiftly than its peer states.
Even if the probability of liability is low, this concern is likely to be salient for outside for personal liability because each additional board membership increases the threat of liability.
And directors, after all, make the decision where to incorporate. The lawyers who advise those directors are also likely to find liability concerns salient, and lawyers are the most common instigators of reincorporation decisions (Romano, 1985) . Moodie (2004) A substantial portion of the preference for anti-takeover provisions found by Subramanian (2002) and Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002) A number of recent studies have attempted to measure the quality of corporate governance either by simply counting the number of anti-takeover statutes in a state, or by constructing corporate governance indices (Gompers et al. (2003) , Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) ). As Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) note, however, counting the number of anti-takeover statutes may fail to provide an accurate picture of management protection because they do not account for the effect of substitute, non-statutory protections and they also may fail to weight smaller firms, i.e., greater value between 1991 and 1996, but no significant difference between 1997-2002. 9 If the quest for anti-takeover protection were the primary motivation for fleeing California, Delaware seems an ). In addition to Nevada's relatively stringent anti-takeover protections, it is also cheaper than Delaware, both in terms of franchise fees, and in terms of potential litigation costs. Taking all of these factors together, it seems unlikely that California firms choose Delaware incorporation for anti-takeover reasons.
appropriately substitute protection mechanisms. 10 For these reasons, Bhagat and Bolton (2006) argue that the measurement error in these indices can make them less informative than just using one or two variables that can be measured more accurately. They find that firms with higher governance indices are less likely to have forced management turnover. Based on this finding, they argue that these governance indices may be poor measures of entrenchment. 11
CEO Hiring and termination Decisions
There is a substantial body of literature focusing on CEO turnover, but none of these papers focus on the role of state of incorporation. Falaye (2007) A number of papers consider the disciplinary role of takeovers; this work documents significant changes in management after such external control transactions (e.g. Martin and McConnell (1991) , Denis and Denis (1995) ). A standard agency cost theory would posit that discouraging takeovers may lead to lower sensitivity of turnover to performance. We are not aware of any papers that test the proposition that state-level takeover protection leads to a lower likelihood of turnover.
Data Description
Identifying historical State of Incorporation
We obtain state of incorporation from Compact Disclosure and quarterly Compustat. We then check for reincorporation when we find a change of state of reincorporation and verify it with a reincorporation proposal in proxy statements. This process helps us identify our sample of incorporations and reincorporations. 12 For most of the study, we restrict our incorporation sample to Execucomp firms on Compustat with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11.
We classify firms two ways: (1) by location of their headquarters (from Compustat); and (2) by state of incorporation. We sort the sample firms into four categories of states: (1) California; (2) Delaware; (3) Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and (post-1998) Maryland, 13 for which we use the shorthand "OPMM"; and (4) Other States. We classify California separately because of the large number of firms in our sample from that state, its low level of characteristics, Bradley et al. (2007) , find that Delaware firms have lower credit ratings. Overall, these papers suggest that the choice to incorporate in Delaware may carry with it a higher cost of debt. 12 Mansi, Maxwell, and Wald (2006) collect this information from Mergent online.
anti-takeover protection, as well as the idiosyncratic features of its corporate law discussed in the last section. We classify separately firms incorporated in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland based on the strength of those states anti-takeover statutes, which are generally regarded as a step above those found in other states, including Delaware. If anti-takeover statutes promote management entrenchment, the effect should be most pronounced for those four states, and least pronounced for California. Other States provide our baseline. We do not separately classify firms headquartered in Delaware because they are so few in number.
Identifying Governance Characteristics
Data for most of the governance variables used in this study are obtained from the IRRC We obtain information on CEO tenure, Director Retainer, and Number of Meetings using Execucomp.
Identifying CEO Turnover
We collect our primary data set relating to CEO turnover from Execucomp, which provides data on S&P 1,500 firms. Execucomp provides executive names and the date they become CEO which we use to identify CEOs and their turnover. We then use Factiva to search and classify these turnovers as "Forced" or otherwise. Based on the methodology in Parrino identify a forced CEO turnover as the year in which there is a change in the name of the CEO and the CEO is less than 60 years of age at that time.
3.4.Sources for other data
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. We get all returns measures and the delisting codes from CRSP. All accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. We use Andrew
Metrick's website for the G-index used as a measure of corporate governance.
14 We obtain the E-index of entrenchment from Lucian Bebchuk's website. Delaware directors have a significantly shorter tenure than directors of firms incorporated elsewhere.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
We find additional evidence of higher demand for Delaware directors. We find that the outside directors of the Delaware firms in our sample serve on a significantly greater number of boards than do the directors for the California, OPMM, and all firms overall, and that this the primary factor determining incorporations.
translates into a greater likelihood that Delaware boards are Busy, defined as a majority of outside directors holding three or more directorships.
Panel C of Table 2 presents evidence on shareholder influence. Delaware firms have significantly greater institutional ownership, suggesting they may face greater external scrutiny.
Delaware firms have a significantly higher G-Index than California firms, but lower than OPMM and Other firms. This pattern holds as well for the E-Index, which focuses on structural antitakeover features. Both indices rely in part on the law of the state of incorporation, so these patterns are expected.
To assess these differences in governance characteristics and shareholder influence more rigorously, we include Delaware incorporation as an independent variable in regressions using the governance characteristics as the dependent variable. Few models of governance structure exist in the literature motivating the relationship between firm characteristics and measures of governance. So, for all our models, we include the same control variables that are likely to be related to governance needs: Book to Market, Log Total Assets, and Years Since IPO.
The results of these regressions, which account for clustering at the firm level, are presented in Table 3 . The coefficient estimate for the Delaware variable is significant at the one percent level for a number of the governance characteristics when we use the entire sample For the variables with relatively uncontroversial predicted directions, the results suggest that Delaware firms are less entrenched. Delaware boards are smaller, which research has shown makes for more effective monitoring (Yermack, 1996) . Delaware outside directors have also served for a shorter period of time, on average, which may mean that they are more independent.
Turning to shareholder influence, Delaware firms have higher institutional ownership and lower G-and E-Indices for the overall sample. This finding suggests that attracting institutional investors may be a motive to incorporate in Delaware. This point is supported by anecdotal evidence from corporate lawyers, who say that they counsel clients to reincorporate in Delaware before their IPOs because Delaware law provides a known quantity for investors attempting to evaluate the firm. Incorporating in Delaware allows those investors to economize on information costs, which may be important if they have a larger number of portfolio companies. The heavier concentration of institutional investors is relevant to this study because institutional investors may exert pressure on board members to be active monitors of management performance.
Standard agency cost theory posits that larger shareholders may be able to overcome collective action problems and keep management on a tighter leash. Del Guercio et al. (2008) find that shareholder activism is associated with greater CEO turnover. Overall, the evidence favors lower director entrenchment and more external monitoring in Delaware firms than firms incorporated in California, OPMM, or in other states.
We look next at the other side of the balance, the CEO. The protection against liability discussed above may be a factor allowing Delaware firms to attract outsiders as executives. If Delaware firms enjoy a higher supply of executives, this might lower their costs from terminating their CEOs for poor performance (Hermalin, 2005) .
We also find some evidence that Delaware CEOs may be higher profile, defined as being included in various "Top N" lists published by business periodicals. When compared with the entire sample, Delaware incorporated firms are more likely to have a high profile CEO; the differences are insignificant for California and OPMM.
We find additional evidence that Delaware CEOs may have greater bargaining power. As with the differences in governance characteristics and shareholder influence, we include Delaware incorporation as an independent variable in regressions using the CEO characteristics as the dependent variable. We again use as control variables Book to Market, Log Total Assets, and Years Since IPO. The results are presented in Table 5 .
Panel B of
<<Table 5 here>>
When we run the regressions for the entire sample, we find significant negative coefficients for the Delaware indicator variable for the regressions with CEO Tenure. The CEO Tenure coefficient is also negative for the California and OPMM sub-samples, but these coefficients are not significant. Delaware CEOs are also younger, except when compared to the OPMM firms, where the sign is reversed, although the coefficients are insignificant. The coefficients for CEO/Chair are insignificant. We also find a positive and marginally significant Delaware coefficient in the CEO Directorships regression for the California sub-sample.
How do these differences in governance, shareholder influence, and CEO characteristics translate into the governance outcome of terminating the CEO? Table 6 , Panel A summarizes the proportion of CEOs turned over in each of our three incorporation groups, presenting both forced turnover and the overall (forced + voluntary) turnover for our sample. The forced turnover rates in Delaware incorporated firms is about 2.6% and is significantly higher than the 1.93% rate observed for all non-Delaware incorporated firms. Overall turnover is also higher for the Delaware firms, but the difference seems largely attributable to the higher forced turnover for Delaware firms.
<<Table 6 here>>
Does Delaware Entrench Management?
To check whether some of the turnover rate differences documented in Panel A can be attributed to turnovers related to mergers or delistings, we compile turnover statistics for all firms that drop out of Execucomp. Panel B of Table 6 
Regression Analysis
The univariate statistics of Table 6 suggest that Delaware firms are more likely to terminate their CEOs. The analysis above, however, suggests that Delaware firms differ from their counterparts in their financial, governance, shareholder, and CEO characteristics.
Accordingly, in this section we use a multivariate framework to examine the relation between Delaware incorporation and the likelihood of forced turnover.
We use two approaches to this question. In the first, we use Forced Turnover as the dependent variable, which equals one if the CEO is turned over in that year and zero otherwise.
19
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from single stage logistic regressions. Panel B presents 18 The multivariate analysis presented in Table 7 contains only of turnovers described in Panel A of Table 6 . It does not include the turnover related to mergers and delistings.
the results from a two stage approach similar to Jenter and Kanaan (2008) . In the first stage we decompose the returns in a year into systematic component based on industry returns and firmspecific component. In the second stage, we estimate the CEO turnover regression using the Cox proportional hazard model. In this model, we estimate the probability that the CEO will be fired in a given year, conditional on (s)he continues to be employed after last year. In these regressions, we consider voluntary turnovers to be right-censored.
<<Table 7 here>>
In the logistic regressions presented in Panel A, we include two variables for firm performance. The two firm performance variables are stock market returns for one and two years prior, adjusted by industry (using Fama/French 48 industry classification). We industryadjust our performance measures to filter out exogenous industry shocks. 21 The standard errors presented in the table account for potential clustering at the firm level. In the base regressions, which includes only the two performance variables and indicator variables for Delaware, California, and OPMM incorporation, the coefficient for the Delaware indicator variable is 0.266 (Odds ratio 1.31), which is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for California incorporation is negative, but insignificant, which does not support the hypothesis that California's supposedly pro-shareholder corporate law discourages management entrenchment.
Notably, the coefficient for the OPMM indicator variable is also insignificant, which does not support the hypothesis that the stringent antitakeover protections in those states entrench management. It is possible, however, that takeovers and terminations are substitute disciplinary 19 We also instrumented "Delaware" incorporation using Book to Market, Operating Income Volatility, R&D/Sales, and Operating Income. The results obtained from the instrumental variable probit regressions are qualitatively the same as in the single stage regression. 20 Given the small proportion of forced CEO turnovers each year, we use annual observations instead of monthly observations as in Jenter and Kanaan (2008) . If we use monthly observations, the Delaware variable is stronger than the results discussed here. 21 The results are qualitatively unaltered if we use raw returns. 
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The coefficient, however, is positive, the opposite of the predicted direction. Among the CEO characteristics, CEOs with longer tenure and who serve as Chair are less likely to be terminated for poor performance relative to industry peers. Overall, Delaware firms appear to be more likely to terminate CEOs, which is inconsistent with the argument that Delaware laws entrenches managers.
For our second set of regressions, we run a hazard model similar to the turnover regression in Jenter and Kaanan (2008) . In the first stage, we run regressions of firm's returns in the turnover year (Year −1) and in the previous year (Year −2) on the corresponding period equally weighted industry (Fama-French 48 industry classification) returns. These regressions predict the probability that the current CEO will be fired over the next year. The results, presented in Panel B of Table 7 , are quite similar to those from the logit models. In the base models, the Delaware coefficient is significant at the five percent level. When we include the board control variables, the coefficient for the Delaware incorporation variable is no longer significant at conventional levels, and the pattern of significance is essentially the same for the control variables, except that High CEO Voting is significant with a negative coefficient in the CEO model. In three of the five models the Delaware indicator variable is significant at the five percent level; the two models that include board characteristics generate insignificant Delaware coefficients.
Overall, we find no support for the managerial entrenchment hypothesis posited by the "race to the bottom" proponents. Our findings suggest that Delaware firms are more likely to terminate CEOs for poor performance than firms incorporated in other states. Moreover, we find no evidence that firms incorporated in shareholder protective California are more likely to terminate their CEO for poor performance. Nor do we find evidence that the antitakeover OPMM states are any less likely to terminate CEOs for poor performance. we analyze changes in operating performance after turnover of the CEO for the Delaware, OPMM, California, and Other firms. Operating performance significantly improves for all groups after forced CEO turnover, but the differences between the groups are insignificant. The
Robustness Checks
results are similar when we analyze the long run stock performance after forced CEO turnover.
The alphas from Fama-French three factor and Carhart four factor regressions are positive for all groups. But a hedge portfolio formed by shorting Delaware firms and holding all other firms long from the month of the turnover and holding it for one year (or two), does not produce significant alphas. This indicates that turnover in Delaware is not due to Delaware directors willing to pull the trigger on CEOs too quickly.
Conclusion
This study focuses on the relation between a firm's state of incorporation and its corporate governance. We find that Delaware firms attract directors who enjoy greater demand for their services and more institutional investors. Our primary measure of the efficacy of corporate governance is the likelihood that a firm terminates its CEO after poor performance. In most of our specifications, we find that Delaware firms are more likely to fire their CEO in response to poor firm performance. Nonetheless, this great willingness to terminate underperforming CEOs does not appear to limit the ability of Delaware firms to attract external CEO candidates. Nor do we find evidence that competition among states in the provision of corporate law promotes director or CEO entrenchment; Delaware directors and CEOs have a shorter tenure than their counterparts in firms incorporated in other states and are subject to more institutional monitoring.
Overall, we conclude that our findings are inconsistent with the race to the bottom hypothesis. We find no evidence that competition among the states in the provision of corporate law promotes management entrenchment or director tenure. Delaware may be pandering to management, but it does not appear to do so by entrenching management. Firm with headquarters in California.
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Firm incorporated in California.
Firm incorporated in Delaware.
Firm with headquarters in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland (post 1998) headquarters.
Firm incorporated in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland (post 1998).
All firms on sample incorporated in the state of their headquarters All firms on sample that are incorporated in Delaware Total Assets In millions.
Book to Market Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity (shares outstanding x price at end of the year) Leverage Dividends Ratio of long term debt plus the debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets.
Dividends paid to common shareholders, scaled by earnings available to common shareholders.
Total Payout Sum of dividends and stock repurchases, scaled by earnings available to common shareholders.
R&D Operating Income
Amount of research and development, scaled by Sales. Number of years since firm's initial public offering.
Operating income for year prior, scaled to mean return for industry.
Operating income for year two years prior, scaled to mean return for industry.
Total number of directors.
Percentage of outside directors on the board.
Percentage of shares held by institutions. Source is IRRC; if not available on IRRC, the data are obtained from Compact Dislosur/Spectrum.
Governance index from Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) . When the G-index is not available for a particular year, we use the nearest past years' index as our measure of the current year's G-index.
Entrenchment index from Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2004) .
Average number of meetings per year held by the full board for the prior three years.
Cash compensation paid to directors.
Mean number of years that outside directors have been on board.
Mean number of external directorships of public companies held by outside directors.
Indicator variable equal to one if a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, and zero otherwise.
Percentage of votes held by CEO.
CEO holding more than five percent of voting power.
Number of outside directorships held by CEO.
CEO-Chair
CEO Age
Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as Chair, and zero otherwise.
Age of CEO in years
External CEO High Profile CEO Indicator variable equal to one if CEO named to that position within one year of joining the firm, and zero otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to one if CEO is included in one of the following lists, and zero otherwise (Rajagopal, Shevlin, and Zamora , 2006) . The Table provides 
Tests of Differences
All firms HQ = Inc. 
All firms Inc. = DE
Tests of Differences
All firms HQ = Inc.
All firms Inc. = DE
Tests of Differences
Board Size 8.40 (7) 8.14 (8) The Table shows the results of regressions (clustered robust standard errors in parentheses) of certain governance characteristics as the dependent variable. The variables are defined in the Appendix. All regressions are estimated with OLS, except for Busyness, which is a estimated with a logistic regression. Panel A provides the results for regression using the entire sample, while Panel B is the subsample of firms with California headquarters that are incorporated in California or Delaware, and Panel C is the subsample of firms with OPMM headquarters that are incorporated in either their headquarters state or Delaware. Coefficients that are significant at the five percent level and one percent level are in italics and bold, respectively. Parrino (1997) . Panel B provides the reasons for firms exiting the Execucomp database. "Merger" refers to the number of firms that are acquired where there are no reports of conflicts between the management of the acquirer and the target. When such disagreements are found, they are classified as "hostile." "Delisting" refers to the number of firms that stop trading due to performance reasons. Turnovers in these firms are considered to be "forced" if the CEO is removed immediately at or before the merger/delisting announcement and there are news reports indicating poor performance. If the CEO is part of the transition team after the merger and serves for at most a year with the merged firm, then the turnover is considered to be "Not Forced." If the target CEO continues as an officer of the acquirer for more than a year, then we classify it as "No turnover." Table 7 Determinants of Forced CEO turnover
The table presents models of the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, using Forced Turnover as the dependent variable for each. Panel A presents the results of single stage logistic regressions estimated with clustered (robust) standard errors. In panel B, we run a hazard model similar to the turnover regression in Jenter and Kaanan (2008) . In the first stage, we run regressions of firm's returns in the turnover year (Year −1) and in the previous year (Year −2) on the corresponding period CRSP value weighted returns. For the hazard model, voluntary turnovers are considered as censored. Coefficients for DE Inc. that are significant at the five percent level and one percent level are in italics and bold, respectively. To maximize data usage in the full models presented on the right hand side of each table, we set a value of zero to variables with missing values, and correspondingly set a value of '1' to an indicator variable signifying that the variable data was missing. Coefficients for these indicator variables are not reported in the table; they are generally significant at the five percent level or lower. 
